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Article 7 of Virginia's Corporation Code,' under the general head-
ing of "dissolution",2 describes the various methods by which corpo-
rate existence terminates in Virginia. Although Article 7 speaks in
terms of dissolution per se, in reality there are three separate and
distinct forms of dissolution: (1-) voluntary dissolution,3 (2) forfei-
ture,4 and (3) liquidation of the corporation by a court of equity
upon the petition of either the stockholders or the creditors of the
corporation sought to be dissolved.' Each section is sui generis and
has certain procedures which incorporators, the State Corporation
Commission (Commission), stockholders, or creditors must follow in
order to dissolve the corporation of which they are a part or of which
they have a public or private interest. The procedures for each pro-
vision raise legal issues which effect, either directly or indirectly, the
rights and interests of the parties described above.
This article consists of five separate parts which not only analyze
the three methods of dissolution previously mentioned but also de-
tail the survival of remedies after dissolution' and lastly suggests
legislative reform for selected provisions in an effort to streamline
unnecessary provisions and to eliminate inequities in others. The
* B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1971; J.D., Temple University, 1975; Staff Attorney,
United States Department of Labor, Region I.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-79 to -101 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. In its broadest sense dissolution of a corporation has been defined as "the termination
of its corporate existence in any manner, whether by the expiration of the charter, decree of
court, act of the Legislature . . ." New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Friedman, 153 Misc.
697, 276 N.Y.S. 72, 74 (1934), a governmental decree, or the voluntary act of its members.
"It becomes civiliter mortuus." Id. Dissolution involves, implies, and contemplates the end
of the corporate existence. Id.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-79 to -81 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-91 & -93 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Sections 13.1-91 and 13.1-93 are
entitled automatic and involuntary dissolution, respectively. However, as described in more
detail in Section II infra, both dissolutions are in the nature of and are more properly called
forfeitures.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-101 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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analysis first outlines the mechanics of the section under discussion,
identifies the legal issues associated with each provision, and then
examines Virginia case law and relevant case law of other jurisdic-
tions so that the problems and pitfalls presented by corporate disso-
lution may be understood and thereby avoided by both lawyer and
layman alike.
I. VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
In Virginia, voluntary dissolution is a deliberate choice made by
the stockholders or the incorporators of the corporation and can be
performed in one of three ways: (1) by dissolving a corporation
before it has commenced business and has issued stock,' (2) by
written consent of all its stockholders,8 or (3) by corporate resolution
wherein more than two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote affirma-
tively decide to dissolve the corporation?
Of the three methods described above, dissolving a corporation
before it has commenced business and has issued stock is by far the
easiest and yet the least used of all the voluntary dissolution provi-
sions. Very few corporations can meet the statutory criteria of not
having begun business and not having issued stock since for all
intents and purposes a corporation, as it is commonly regarded, has
not even come into existence at this point; in essence, Virginia has
provided a procedure which permits individuals who have selected
the corporate form in which to do business to change their minds
before either creditors or stockholders have acquired any interest in
the assets of the corporation. When a majority of the incorporators
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-79 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-80 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-81 (Cum. Supp. 1977). It should be noted at this point that a form
of voluntary dissolution (perhaps more properly labelled passive dissolution) not discussed
in this article is the dissolution of a corporation upon the expiration of its charter. Early in
the history of corporations many companies, especially railroads, Rider v. Nelson & Albe-
marle Union Factory, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 154 (1836), and mining operations, Mason v. Pewabic
Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50 (1890), were chartered for a particular purpose and given a clearly
expressed time limit within their charter to achieve this purpose. When this time limit
expired, the corporation ipso facto dissolved without any direct action by the state. At this
point the corporation had a limited existence for the purpose of winding up its affairs. Knights
of Pythias v. Weller, 93 Va. 605, 25 S.E. 891 (1896). However, this issue seldom arises today
since few corporations have pre-determined existences, and, in the absence of a specific period
of duration, corporate existence is deemed to be perpetual.
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execute a document entitled "articles of dissolution"' 0 and deliver
this document to the Commission, the Commission, after it finds
that the articles of dissolution comply with the requirements of law
and that all required fees have been paid, shall by order issue a
certificate of dissolution." Upon the issuance of a certificate of dis-
solution, the existence of a corporation comes to a complete end.' 2
Sections 13.1-80 and 13.1-81, respectively, set forth the require-
ments for voluntary dissolution by written consent of all stockhold-
ers and by affirmative vote of more than two-thirds of the shares of
corporate stock entitled to vote for or against dissolution.'3 Unlike
section 13.1-80 which does not fequire a formal meeting to discuss
dissolution, section 13.1-81 requires the board of directors to adopt
a resolution recommending dissolution and to give notice to each
stockholder of record that a meeting will be held to consider the
10. The statutory requirements for articles of dissolution are set forth in VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-79(a)(1)-(6)(Cum. Supp. 1977). It should be mentioned that the articles of dissolution
and the statement of intent to dissolve, which are mandated for voluntary dissolution under
sections 13.1-80 and 13.1-81, are materially different. Indeed, the requirements for a state-
ment of an intent to dissolve under the above-referenced sections differ between themselves.
Compare § 13.1-80(a)-(d) with 13.1-81(d)(1)-(6).
11. The Virginia Supreme Court, in Jeffries v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 425, 93 S.E. 701
(1917), held, inter alia, that once a corporation has complied with the statutory requirements
for voluntary dissolution, the function of the Commission in issuing the certificate of dissolu-
tion is purely ministerial. The court explained:
The form and wisdom of the method of voluntary surrender of corporate franchises are
matters which were expressly delegated to the legislature by the terms of the Constitu-
tion, and as to them neither the Corporation Commission nor this court can have any
controlling voice.
121 Va. at 431, 93 S.E. at 702.
12. It would appear that the provisions of section 13.1-101 which provide for the survival
of remedies after dissolution, i.e., empowering a corporation to sue or be sued after dissolu-
tion, are inapplicable in the context of a section 13.1-79 dissolution since, if a corporation
has not commenced business and has not issued stock, it is doubtful whether any rights or
interests of creditors or stockholders have come into existence thereby precluding a cause of
action from arising.
13. In sustaining the constitutionality of an earlier statute similar to section 13.1-81 (see
Michie's Va. Code 1942 § 3820(a)), the Virginia Supreme Court in Craddock-Terry Co. v.
Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363 (1943) held, inter alia, "the sales statute . . . is not
violative of any constitutional inhibition (sec. 158); that is, the legislature has power to
authorize a corporation to sell all of its assets for cash or securities with the consent of two-
thirds of the stockholders of each class of stock." Id. at 434, 25 S.E.2d at 369-70. If a two-
thirds majority authorizing dissolution is constitutionally permissible, then presumably the
unanimous written consent of stockholders pursuant to section 13.1-80 would meet constitu-
tional muster as well.
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advisability of dissolving the corporation." However, even though
the required vote opting for dissolution is attained, some jurisdic-
tions, under certain circumstances, will set aside the corporate reso-
lution favoring dissolution.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in White v. Kincaid,'5 de-
scribed the fiduciary duty in the area of voluntary dissolution by
analogy to the fiduciary duty owed by majority stockholders to mi-
nority stockholders in dictating the actions of corporate directors in
such matters as the assignment or disposition of corporate assets.
In these cases, also, if it clearly appears that the action of the man-
agement is in bad faith; that the resolution for dissolution, for in-
stance, has been superinduced by fraud or undue influence, or if it
could be clearly established that this resolution was not taken for the
benefit of the corporation, or in furtherance of its interest, but for the
mere purpose of unjustly oppressing the minority of the stockholders,
or any of them, and causing a destruction or sacrifice of their pecuni-
ary interests or holdings, giving clear indication of a breach of
trust-such action could well become the subject of judicial scrutiny
and control."6
The court in White then cited specific examples which evince a
prima facie breach of the fiduciary duty of the persons in charge of
the corporation:
Such cases almost invariably arise when the management of a sol-
vent concern, going and prosperous, ceases operations and deter-
mines to dissolve and sell out, with a view of continuing the same or
similar business under different control, and when there is indication
given that the sole purpose was to oppress some of the stockholders
and confiscate their holdings, or when it is done in furtherance of
some scheme to promote the pecuniary interest of the actors, and to
the detriment of the corporation, giving indication of a breach of trust
on the part of the authorities in charge and control of the corporate
affairs. 7
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-81(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
15. 149 N.C. 415, 63 S.E. 109 (1908).




Although a situation where majority stockholders have sought to
dissolve a corporation prompted by the factors described above has
not arisen to date in Virginia,'8 courts here should follow the lead of
the court in White where it appears that majority stockholders, in
seeking dissolution, have violated their fiduciary obligations to
other stockholders.
Excluding exceptional circumstances amounting to a breach of
fiduciary duty, section 13.1-82 requires the statement of intent to
dissolve, whether submitted pursuant to the unanimous consent of
the stockholders or pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors,
to be delivered to the Commisgion which will, after it determines
whether the statement complies with the requirements of law and
when the necessary franchise taxes and fees have been paid by the
corporation, file the statement in its office. However, it is important
to note that the ministerial function of the Commission is inapplica-
ble to statements of intent to dissolve filed by public service corpo-
rations. Section 13.1-82 specifically mandates that the Commission
not file the statement of intent to dissolve of a public service corpo-
ration, "unless it finds that the corporation is not actually perform-
ing any public service, or should not be required to continue to
perform any public service, or that public convenience and necessity
do not require that it continue to perform any public service."' 9 This
provision appears to overrule that part of Jeffries v. Common-
wealth,2 which stands for the proposition that public service
corporations may voluntarily dissolve, just as their private counter-
parts do, without the approval of the Commission."
18. This set of facts should not be confused with an action by minority stockholders seeking
judicial liquidation of the assets and business of a corporation in a court of equity pursuant
to section 13.1-94(a)(1)-(4), discussed in Section II infra.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-82 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
20. 121 Va. 425, 93 S.E. 701 (1917).
21. The court in Jeffries offered the following rationale for its decision:
That inconvenience and hardship may and probably will result when railroads and
other public utilities cease operations is undeniably true; but the same thing is just as
likely to be true, in greater or less degree according to the character and extent of the
corporate enterprise, of the dissolution of purely private corporations, concerning
which no question is made as to their right to dissolve without notice.
121 Va. at 444, 93 S.E. at 707.
This line of reasoning is somewhat persuasive; however, considering the reliance of the
general public upon public service corporations for energy and transportation needs, the
public interest should require that dissolution of public service corporations be given close
1978]
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After a corporation has filed its statement of intent to dissolve
with the Commission, it must thereupon do two things: (1) it must
immediately mail notice of impending dissolution to each known
creditor," and (2) it must cease doing business, except insofar as
may be necessary for the winding up thereof.23 Although neither
section 13.1-83 nor section 13.1-84 specifically states what is meant
by winding up the affairs of a corporation, section 13.1-84(b) de-
scribes in precise terms what a corporation is required to do to wind
up its affairs properly. A corporation must:
collect its assets, sell, convey and dispose of such of its properties as
are not to be distributed in kind to its stockholders, pay, satisfy and
discharge its liabilities and obligations and do all other acts required
to liquidate its business and affairs, and, after paying or adequately
providing for the payment of all its obligations, distribute the remain-
der of its assets, either in cash or in kind, among its stockholders
according to their respective rights and interests. 4
While the above-mentioned provision specifies what should be
done upon voluntary dissolution, it fails to indicate how it should
be done. As illustrative of a judicially approved method to meet the
statutory requirements of section 13.1-84(b) for winding up a corpo-
ration, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tazewell Electric
Light & Power Company v. Strother permitted the majority of
stockholders to appoint a liquidating trustee to administer the vol-
untary dissolution of the corporation since the appointment was not
expressly prohibited by the statute.
Once a corporation has decided upon voluntary dissolution, it
scrutiny by the Commission lest the vital services provided by these corporations be curtailed
or eliminated entirely.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-84(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-83 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-84(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
25. 84 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1936). This case construed former section 3810 of the 1930 Code
of Virginia which called for, among other things, the winding up of corporate affairs without
explaining how. While the Corporation Code of Virginia has undergone substantial amend-
ments since the Tazewell decision (especially the revisions made in 1956), these amendments
have not specified or clarified how a corporation should wind up its affairs and presumably
the method approved in 1936 is still acceptable.
Former section 3810 has been replaced by section 13.1-101 which provides for the survival
of remedy after corporate dissolution.
[Vol. 12:333
VIRGINIA CORPORATIONS
does have an opportunity, if done before the Commission issues a
certificate of dissolution, to effectively rescind its statement of in-
tent to dissolve. 2 Essentially, the provisions in question require the
corporation to do the exact opposite of what it did in obtaining its
statement of intent to dissolve, viz.: unanimous written consent is
required to revoke a dissolution pursuant to section 13.1-80 or the
board of directors of a corporation must adopt a resolution recom-
mending that voluntary dissolution proceedings be revoked, send
notice of a meeting for the above purpose to each stockholder of
record, hold said meeting, and obtain the required approval of more
than two-thirds of the shares eligible to vote on the issue. After the
filing of the statement of revocation of voluntary dissolution pro-
ceedings with the Commission and if the statement complies with
the requirements of law and all required fees and franchise taxes
have been paid, the Commission shall issue a certificate of rein-
statement.21 "Upon the issuance by the Commission of a certificate
of reinstatement the dissolution proceedings shall be revoked and
the corporation may again carry on its business."28 Assuming, how-
ever, that a corporation has determined to dissolve voluntarily
under either section 13.1-80 or section 13.1-81, has filed the requisite
statement of intent to dissolve, and has proceeded to wind up its
affairs in accordance with section 13.1-84(b), an important question
arises: What is the status of the corporation from the time it begins
to wind up its affairs until the Commission issues a certificate of
dissolution under section 13.1-90 which officially terminates a cor-
poration's existence? 29 Section 13.1-83 provides in relevant part that
26. Section 13.1-85 specifies the requirements to revoke a voluntary dissolution by unani-
mous written consent of the stockholders under section 13.1-80; section 13.1-86 states the
requirements to revoke voluntary dissolutions by more than two-thirds of the stockholders
eligible to vote thereon under section 13.1-81. For federal income tax purposes, however,
"[t]he voluntary dissolution of a corporation . .. is such a definitive and irrevocable act
done under the hand and seal of the Virginia State Corporation Commission that there is no
room for a subsequent denial or alteration of the fact." Shull v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 680,
682 (4th Cir. 1961). The above-quoted passage, however, would appear to apply to a corpora-
tion whose voluntary dissolution papers have been approved by the Commission and not to
a corporation which is seeking to revoke the voluntary dissolution proceedings it instituted
under either section 13.1-85 or section 13.1-86.
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-87 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-88 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
29. An intermediate step in the final voluntary dissolution of a corporation requires the
corporation, pursuant to section 13.1-89, to file articles of dissolution with the Commission
1978] 339
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"its corporate existence shall continue until a certificate of dissolu-
tion has been issued by the Commission." 3 At this point, barring
any activities on the part of the corporation to continue its business
in its customary manner, the corporation has a qualified existence
for the sole purpose of winding up its affairs; it is neither a de facto
corporation which would require "a law under which the corporation
might be organized . . ." and that "corporate powers have been
thereafter exercised," 31 nor is it a de jure corporation under which
corporate existence no longer exists as a matter of law.
It is conceivable to envision a situation where, in the process of
winding up, a corporation may decide, for whatever, reason, to re-
sume business. In this instance the corporation would have a de
facto existence, but unlike an automatic or involuntary dissolu-
tion,"2 which calls for corporate and/or individual liability for con-
tracts made or torts committed during this period, only corporate
liability would attach since nowhere in the voluntary dissolution
provisions is there any mention of individual liability for actions
performed during the winding-up phase. Given sections 13.1-85 and
13.1-86 by which a corporation can rescind its decision to dissolve
voluntarily and be reinstated with full corporate powers, a corpora-
tion, however, can easily avoid the predicament described above by
filing the appropriate papers seeking reinstatement.
Even though a corporation's existence legally ends once its arti-
cles of dissolution have been approved by the Commission and the
required order is entered, it should be noted: "Upon the issuance of
after " 'all assets of the corporation have been distributed to its creditors and stockholders'
[which] means that the corporation has divested itself of all its assets by the payment of
claims or liquidating dividends or by assignment to a trustee or trustees for the benefit of
claimants or stockholders." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-89 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In addition to the
foregoing, the corporation is required to "file a certificate signed by the State Tax Commis-
sioner that the corporation has filed a return and has paid all State taxes on account of its
income to the time of the certificate." Id. Again, if the Commission finds that the corporation
has complied with the requirements of law and has paid its fees and taxes, it shall by order
issue a certificate of dissolution.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-83 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
31. Von Longerke v. City of N.Y., 150 App. Div. 98, 134 N.Y.S. 832, 836 (1912), followed
in Wilson v. Brown, 107 Misc. 167, 175 N.Y.S. 688, 691 (1919). Theoretically, a corporation
existing under section 13.1-83 would be de facto; however, if it is totally committed to liqui-
dating its assets and making the appropriate distributions, it would not be exercising its
corporate powers and therefore would not be a de facto corporation.
32. See Section I infra.
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such certificate of dissolution the existence of the corporation shall
cease, except for the purpose of suits, other proceedings and appro-
priate corporate action by stockholders, directors and officers as
provided in this Act. '33 This is a direct reference to section 13.1-101,
which provides for the survival of remedies after dissolution for any
right or claim existing or any liability incurred prior to dissolution.
A discussion of section 13.1-101 and its effects on the rights and
interests of all parties concerned follows in Part IV.
I. AUTOMATIC AND INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
Virginia provides for the automatic dissolution of a corporation
when it fails to file annual reports or to pay the annual registration
fee or franchise tax for two successive annual dates as required by
law and requires involuntary dissolution whenever a corporation
exceeds or abuses the authority conferred upon it by law, fails to
maintain a registered office or a registered agent within the state as
required by law, or fails to comply with any act required by the
Commission pursuant to 13.1-133.11 In reality, the term "dissolu-
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-90 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (emphasis added).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-91 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The instant statute traces its origin to a
constitutional provision adopted in 1902 which subsequently became incorporated into a tax
law in 1903 and was later amended in 1906. This sequence of events was explained by the
Virginia Supreme Court in Elliot's Knob Iron, Steel & Coal Co. v. State Corp. Comm., 123
Va. 63, 96 S.E. 353 (1918):
By section 157 of the Constitution of Virginia of 1902, a constitutional provision
was adopted which was not contained in the state Constitution theretofore existing,
and which, so far as material in the instant case, is as follows:
. ..The failure by any corporation for two successive years to pay its annual regis-
tration fee, or to make its said annual reports, shall, when such failure shall have
continued for ninety days after the expiration of such two years, operate as a revocation
and annulment of the charter of such corporation ....
123 Va. at 66-67, 96 S.E. at 353-54. Then after repeating an almost identical provision, as
the one cited above, which appeared in a tax bill which became law on April 16, 1903, the
court further stated:
The tax bill which became a law March 17, 1906, amended the last three para-
graphs of section 41 of the tax bill of 1903 . . .so that the whole of such statute (so
far as material) read [sic] as follows:
"The failure of any corporation for two successive years to pay its annual registra-
tion fee, or to make such report, shall, when such failure shall have continued for
ninety days after the expiration of such two years, operate, without further
proceedings, as a revocation and annulment of the charter of such corporation ..
123 Va. at 69-70, 96 S.E. at 354.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-93 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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tion" used in the statutes under discussion is a legal misnomer
and should more properly be termed a "forfeiture" of a corpora-
tion's charter for failure to perform certain acts by a certain time
as mandated by the State in its compact with the corporation.
Fletcher, in his treatise on corporate law, states the general rule
regarding the effect a forfeiture has on corporate existence in cir-
cumstances analogous to automatic dissolution under section 13.1-
91:31
Failure of a corporation to make reports or to pay franchise taxes or
fees as required by statute, although good ground for forfeiture of the
company's charter, does not, of itself, work a dissolution but at most
causes a suspension of some or all of the company's powers.1
However, as an exception to the general rule quoted above,
Fletcher notes:
Whether or not such forfeiture results ipso facto from the corpora-
tion's failure to make the required report or to pay the prescribed
taxes or fees must, of course, depend upon the terms of the particular
statute. It is undoubtedly within the power of a state legislature to
declare that a corporation thus delinquent shall ipso facto cease to
exist, and enactments of that character have been passed and upheld
as constitutional.38
In a footnote to the passage quoted above, Fletcher lists Virginia
as one of five jurisdictidns in which failure to file annual reports or
to pay annual franchise taxes results in an ipso facto forfeiture of a
36. 16A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Rev. Vol. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
FLETcHER]. Presumably Fletcher's analysis would equally apply to omissions of a corporation
under the involuntary dissolution provisions of section 13.1-93 since for all intents and pur-
poses there is no appreciable difference in the prejudice visited upon the state or the public
for failing to perform any of the requirements identified in either statute.
The importance of filing annual reports is best stated in People v. Buffalo Stone & Cement
Co., 131 N.Y. 140, 29 N.E. 947, 948-49 (1892):
The duty is not simply one in which particular persons are alone interested, but it is a
duty which the corporation owes to the public generally for the protection of all persons
who may have occasion to deal with it, and to subserve a plainly expressed public
policy; and for the omission to perform the duty it incurs the liability of forfeiture of
its charter.
37. FLETCHER, supra note 36, at § 7997.
38. Id. (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 12:333
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corporate charter. The apparent rationale for Fletcher's conclusion
regarding Virginia stems from the Virginia Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Lackland,39
where the directors and trustees of the James River Concrete Pipe
& Products Corporation, which had forfeited its corporate charter
as of May 31, 1937, for failure to pay'the registration fee and fran-
chise tax assessed against it for two preceding years, instituted suit
against a surety company. Under section 3812 of the Virginia Code,
a forerunner statute to section 13.1-91,11 a corporation which had
dissolved, expired, or whose charter had been revoked by operation
of law, could, through its directors, who became trustees of the
corporation, settle the outstanding affairs of the corporation, i.e.,
file suit. The surety company raised the defense that revocation of
the charter of a corporation for its failure to pay its registration fee
and franchise tax did not work a "dissolution" of a corporation
within the meaning of section 3812 of the Code and therefore the
plaintiffs had no right to file suit. The court rejected defendant's
contention and stated:
We think it is too plain for argument that the "revocation and
annulment of the charter" of this corporation for the failure to pay
its taxes, was a "dissolution, expiration or revocation by operation of
law" of the corporation within the meaning of section 3812. .... 1
Virginia's unique automatic dissolution provision which works a
forfeiture of a corporate charter by operation of law has the legal
effect of causing a de jure dissolution as opposed to a de facto disso-
lution."
39. 175 Va. 178, 8 S.E.2d 306 (1940).
40. The relevant portion of section 13.1-91 states in pertinent part:
[T]he trustees shall proceed to collect the assets of the corporations, sell, convey and
dispose of such of its properties as are not to be distributed in kind to its stockholders,
pay, satisfy and discharge its liabilities and obligations and do all other acts required
to liquidate its business and affairs, and, after paying or adequately providing for the
payment of all its obligations, distribute the remainder of its assets, either in cash or
in kind, among its stockholders according to their respective rights and interests.
41, 175 Va. at 191, 8 S.E.2d at 311 (emphasis added).
42. An explanation of a de facto and de jure corporate dissolution is provided in 8 CAvrrCH,
BusNmEss ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNiNo (1977):
The dissolution of any corporate entity may either be "de facto" or "de jure." A de
facto dissolution occurs when a corporation terminates its business either because of
19781
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Although the corporation is legally dead in a de jure dissolution,
some semblance of corporate activity remains as upon dissolution
under section 13.1-91 because the corporation's "properties and af-
fairs shall pass automatically to its directors as trustees in dissolu-
tion ' 4 3 and they are instructed under the statute to wind up the
corporate affairs." All too often, however, whether because the
insolvency, the loss of all its assets or some similar reason, disabling in nature. How-
ever, at no time does the corporation lose its mandate and legal status to act as a
corporation. On the other hand, a de jure dissolution takes place when that legal
mandate to act as a corporation either has been removed by court decree or no longer
exists as a matter of law. The latter situation may occur upon the happening of a
condition subsequent, i.e., the period of incorporation having expired, or through for-
feiture. Although the corporation may continue in either instance to have the physical
capability of doing business, it is still considered legally "dead" upon dissolution. As
a result, the corporation loses its franchise, which had been granted to it by the state,
to conduct its affairs as a corporation.
Id. at § 185.02(3)(footnotes omitted).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-91 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
44. See note 42 supra.
Nowhere in the statutes under consideration is there an explanation of how the trustees
should proceed to wind up the affairs of a corporation. By way of explanation to aid the
Virginia practitioner in this regard, the following language taken from Hogsett v. Dallas
Mortgage Sec. Co., 110 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), is offered as a logical and appropri-
ate method for corporate officials to wind up the affairs of a corporation dissolved under any
of the Virginia dissolution provisions. The passage states the rationale for making the direc-
tors trustees of the corporation, describes how they should act to dissolve the corporation,
and analyzes why they should act in the prescribed manner.
The reason for entrusting to the president and directors of a dissolved corporation the
business of winding up its affairs, obviously, was because of their familiarity with and
interests in its affairs. This could not be said of any stranger selected to fill a vacancy
on the board. Construing similar provisions of a statute and speaking of the legislative
reason for devolving these administrative duties upon existing corporate officers, the
Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Texas Pacific R.R. Co., supra, 48 Tex. 309 at page
319, said: "The statute, in thus providing for the settlement of the affairs of sold-out
railroad companies, was enacted on the supposition that the existing directory were
more familiar with the business of the company, and, if not superseded by legislative
or judicial action, could more readily and satisfactorily wind up and adjust their
unsettled business than any other parties. They are designated trustees, because, in
discharge of the duties imposed upon them, they do not act under authority of the
franchise and charter of the company, but merely as the representatives of its stock-
holders and creditors . . . . The language of the statute plainly indicates that the
power conferred upon them as trustees is to be exercised collectively, and in their
aggregate capacity as a body, and not as individuals. To give to each of the directors
distinct and independent power to wind up and settle the business of the company,
would evidently lead to confusion and conflict of action, which would be injurious to
the interest of the parties for whose benefit they are made trustees; nor would it be
consistent with reason or justice that the trustees should be made jointly and severally
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Commission's notice of impending dissolution never reaches the cor-
porate offices, or because of negligent or willful disregard of the
requirements in question, the corporate directors or officers do not
wind up the affairs of the corporation but instead continue to oper-
ate the corporation as if it still existed as a legally viable entity. In
such a situation the critical issue becomes who is liable to third
persons for contracts made or for torts committed during the period
described above. On this precise question there are no Virginia deci-
sions on point;4" in other jurisdictions where this problem has
emerged the holding of the court was necessarily controlled by the
statute under consideration.
Nonetheless, certain theories have developed from these cases
which provide helpful guidance in interpreting section 13.1-91. In
general, the weight of authority appears to find the corporation itself
liable to third parties in actions ex contractu or ex delicto under a
de facto dissolution analysis rather than on a de jure dissolution
theory. Finding corporate liability instead of individual liability is
bottoied upon interpreting that particular jurisdiction's statute as
providing for some limited form of corporate existence, the possibil-
ity of reinstatement, or actual reinstatement which fully revives a
responsible for property coming into their hands, unless it came to them in their
collective capacity."
110 S.W.2d at 139 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
45. In a bankruptcy proceeding in In re Booth's Drug Store, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 95 (W.D.
Va. 1937), the court, in analyzing former section 3810 of the Code of Virginia which, although
more akin to § 13.1-101, nevertheless is similar enough for discussion of this question, held,
inter alia, the individuals of a corporation liable for a promissory note when they continued
the business of the corporation instead of winding up the corporate affairs after their charter
had been forfeited for failure to pay their annual registration fee and franchise taxes for two
consecutive years. The court observed:
The statute specifically grants to a dissolved corporation the power to convey and
dispose of its property. For that purpose and to that extent it is still a living entity.
The powers of the corporation are limited after its dissolution but if, acting within the
limits of those powers, it commits an act of bankruptcy, there would seem no reason
why it should be immune from the legal consequences of such act.
Id. at 97.
The court posited the following reasoning for its holding:
To hold otherwise would be to open a rather wide door to fraud and would bar the
bankruptcy courts from taking jurisdiction in a class of cases which would rapidly
increase if such bar was established. Corporations which were dissolved would, in
winding up their affairs, be practically without restriction as to preferences to credi-
tors, either by voluntary transfer of property or by legal proceedings.
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corporation's existence." Other courts have failed to hold individu-
als personally responsible either under the guise of familiar legal
principles, such as the contractual concept of "the intent of the
contracting parties,"47 or upon equitable considerations. 8 However,
given the fact that under section 13.1-91 an automatic dissolution
works a forfeiture of the corporate charter by operation of law
thereby stripping the corporation's legal mandate to exist, there is
no corporation at all, and any action performed by the directors or
officers not looking to the dissolution of the corporation should be
deemed individual actions with concomitant individual liability
therefor. 9
Illustrative of the cases which have found individual liability"0 for
debts (as a result of contracts entered into after forfeiture of the
corporation's charter) is In re Hare,51 which found a husband and
wife jointly liable as partners to petitioning creditors in bankruptcy.
The court explained:
Persons who continue business operations and incur debts in the
name of a forfeited corporation, after forfeiture and prior to revival,
are individually liable for such debts. . . . "Under certain circum-
stances, stockholders, officers and directors may be held liable as
individuals or partners when such stockholders, officers and directors
46. Watts v. Liberty Royalties Corp., 106 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1939). See generally 19 Am.
Jur. 2d. Corporations §§ 1646-52 (1965) and Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1220 (1950).
47. Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 F. 613 (2nd Cir. 1919). The common understanding of both
parties was that a corporation and not a sole proprietorship existed. The court reasoned: "The
plaintiff acted upon the supposition that he was dealing with the defendants, not individu-
ally, but as representing the Crosthwaite & Cannon Company, and the defendants acted upon
the same understanding." Id. at 617.
48. Deutsch v. Aaron & Lillie Straus Foundation, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 551, 552 (D. Md.
1957).
The Court refused to find a ninety-year-old, blind benefactor of a summer camp individu-
ally liable for injuries sustained by a minor at the camp.
49. Research has not encountered a situation where it was disputed whether the activities
performed by the trustees were in the nature of winding up the business or in continuing the
business. Under such circumstances it would appear that the activities of the trustees should
be carefully scrutinized to determine whether they fall within the winding up of corporate
affairs under the statute.
50. See, e.g., Poritzky v. Wachtel, 176 Misc. 633, 27 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1941); Bulova Watch
Co. v. Roberts Jewelers, 240 S.C. 280, 125 S.E.2d 643 (1962); First Nat'l Bank v. Silberstein,
398 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1966); Sheffield v. Nobles, 378 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
51. 205 F. Supp. 881 (D. Md. 1962).
[Vol. 12:333
VIRGINIA CORPORATIONS
permit the charter of a corporation to expire, and continue to obtain
credit for or on behalf of a purported but non-existent corporation. ' 2
The court observed further:
While there are cases to the effect that forfeited corporations, organ-
ized under state law which gives a right of revival, may for some
purposes be treated as corporations, . this doctrine has been pri-
marily invoked where it is necessary to protect the rights of third
persons. . . . The doctrine is clearly inapplicable here, because the
petitioning creditors do not seek relief against Hare Bros., Inc. and
where by Maryland law, the forfeited corporation is deemed non-
existent, and where its operations have been continued for seven and
a half years without revival, in clear violation of the Maryland stat-
ute, it would be unconscionable to permit the alleged bankrupts the
defense that the corporation continues to enjoy a de facto status and
insulates them from personal liability. 3
As with a corporation which seeks to revoke voluntary dissolution
proceedings by following the procedures set forth in either section
13.1-85 or section 13.1-86, a corporation which is automatically dis-
solved may, within five years after its charter has been forfeited,
seek reinstatement under section 13.1-92. A typical case in which a
corporation would seek reinstatement is when an action is brought
against it after its charter has been automatically or involuntarily
dissolved and the directors, officers or shareholders learn the corpo-
ration's legal status and try to protect themselves from individual
52. Id. at 883 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 883-84 (citations omitted).
Likewise, courts have found personal liability in tort actions for individuals who have
continued the operation of the corporation despite its legal nonexistence. In Seavy v. I.X.L.
Laundry, 60 Nev. 324, 108 P.2d 853, 856 (1941), in which a business invitee was injured while
on the defendant's premises, the court stated:
A corporation or those representing it have been held liable after dissolution for torts
committed prior to dissolution, where the statute continued the existence of the corpo-
ration for the purpose of settling and winding up its affairs.
Where the business of a corporation, old and new, is continued as usual, and is not
limited to settling the affairs of the corporation, then the stockholders become person-
ally liable.
See, e.g., Jones v. Young, 115 W.Va. 225, 174 S.E. 885 (1934), which held the stockholder,
who continued the business of a corporation after forfeiture of its charter for non-payment of
license taxes, personally liable for the electrocution of an employee caused by the negligence
of management.
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liability. The key sentence of the reinstatement provision states in
pertinent part:
Upon the entry by the Commission of an order of reinstatement, the
corporate existence shall be deemed to have continued from the date
of dissolution except that reinstatement shall have no effect on any
question of personal liability of the directors, officers, or agents in
respect of the period between dissolution and reinstatement.54
With the above-quoted sentence in mind, an important issue is
what liability, if any, attaches for the acts of directors, officers, or
stockholders performed in the interim period between dissolution
and reinstatement. One commentator provides a succinct answer:
A handful of statutes expressly make the revival of corporate exist-
ence retroactive. Thus its revival becomes effective as of the date on
which the corporation was dissolved and any acts performed by the
corporation in the interim are valid.5
In a footnote immediately following the above-cited statement,
Cavitch suggests, with particular regard to Virginia Code section
13.1-92:
The provision appears to say that, in addition to full retroactive
effect, the corporate directors, officers, and agents will also be person-
ally liable, thus giving corporate creditors double security. 6
From the above-cited analysis of section 13.1-92, it appears that
two things happen when a Virginia corporation automatically dis-
solves and then is subsequently reinstated: (1) acts performed in the
interim period between dissolution and reinstatement are deemed
valid, which precludes either the corporation or its directors from
defending lawsuits on the basis that their actions were void ab
initio, and (2) individual directors, officers, or agents can be held
personally liable for actions they take which go beyond winding
up the affairs of a corporation.57 It is submitted that a party
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-92 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
55. 8 CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS wrrH TAX PLANNING, § 187.02 (1977)(footnotes omit-
ted).
56. Id. at n. 8.
57. See note 56 supra.
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aggrieved by actions performed by either the corporation and/or
its trustees during the time between dissolution and reinstatement
use the "double security" theory posited by Cavitch to first seek
to hold the corporation liable (since under the express terms of
section 13.1-92 a corporation upon reinstatement is deemed to have
continuously existed during the period in question) and then sec-
ondly, seek to hold the individual trustees liable (since reinstate-
ment has no effect upon the liability the trustees incurred while
the corporation had dissolved de jure). However, the above con-
tention should not prevent a court from holding the trustees liable
in the first instance when it is established that the trustees knew
the corporate charter had been forfeited and still intentionally
continued business without any attempt to wind up the affairs of
the corporation, or where the court suspects fraud in the corpora-
tion's subsequent request for reinstatement. As observed by the
court in Poritzky v. Wachtel:58
To approve the application of the statute which the defendant urges
would encourage fraud and abuse. Under such a construction, a for-
mer officer of a dissolved corporation could obtain credit and then
upon subsequent discovery of the non-existence of the corporation, by
merely paying arrears in franchise taxes, could shift the personal
liability which the law would otherwise impose upon him back to the
corporation. 9
Accordingly, in those instances where the trustees willfully and
knowingly continue to operate a corporation despite a legal mandate
not to do so and where such activities smack of fraud, courts should
impose individual liability on the trustees.
Under section 13.1-93 a corporation may be involuntarily dis-
solved for failure to perform certain duties more fully described at
the beginning of this section. Section 13.1-93 is almost a carbon copy
of the automatic dissolution provision, but instead of having a sepa-
rate reinstatement provision (as section 13.1-92), the identical lan-
guage found in section 13.1-92 is incorporated verbatim into the
third paragraph of section 13.1-93. Hence, the analysis describing
the effect on individual liability both before and after reinstatement
58. 176 Misc. 633, 27 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1941).
59. 27 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
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applies as well to section 13.1-93. However, one important feature
not found in section 13.1-91 is contained in the second paragraph
of section 13.1-93 and states in its entirety:
Before entering any such order [involuntarily dissolving a corpora-
tion] the Commission shall issue a rule against the corporation giving
it an opportunity to be heard and show cause why such an order
should not be entered. The Commission may issue the rule on its own
motion or on motion of the Attorney General."0
It appears from the foregoing that unlike an automatic dissolution
situation, a corporation which "involuntarily" dissolves has an op-
portunity to explain its actions (or omissions) and possibly prevent
its charter from being forfeited by the state. Moreover, it would
appear that the type of notice given a corporation in the case of an
involuntary dissolution is more formal as compared with that in an
automatic dissolution proceeding."
III. JUDICIAL LIQUIDATION
Under section 13.1-94 in an action brought by a stockholder12 or
by a creditor, 3 "[a]ny court of record, with general equity jurisdic-
tion in the city or county where the registered office or principal
office of a corporation is located, shall have full power to liquidate
the assets and business of the corporation . ,,." If the action is
instituted by a stockholder,65 one of four conditions must be estab-
lished before the court will liquidate the assets and business of a
corporation:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-93 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
61. Under section 13.1-91 the Commission is only required to "mail notice to [the corpora-
tioni of impending dissolution."
A more detailed comparison of section 13.1-91 and section 13.1-93 and methods to eliminate
any inequities between the two sections follows in Section V infra under the heading of
Legislative Reform.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
65. Research of the statute and applicable case law indicates no minimum stock holdings
are required before suit is brought. Theoretically, a stockholder with one share of stock could
file an action under the provision in question.
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corporate affairs and the stockholders are unable to break the dead-
lock, and that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered
or is threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corpora-
tion are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or
(3) That as shown by the proceedings at any meeting of the stock-
holders the stockholders are deadlocked in voting power and that
irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened
by reason thereof; or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.66
Likewise, a creditor of a corporation can file suit under section
13.1-94(b) and force a liquidation of the assets and business of a
corporation if the creditor establishes one of the following:
(1) When the claim of the creditor has been reduced to judgment
and an execution thereon returned unsatisfied and it is established
that the corporation is insolvent; or
(2) When the corporation has admitted in writing that the claim
of the creditor is due and owing and it is established that the corpora-
tion is insolvent.67
In addition, the court has the power under section 13.1-94 to
appoint a custodian(s) where it determines that the best interest of
both the creditors and stockholders would be served. The custodian
has the authority to continue the business of the corporation, to take
all such actions as might be taken by the board of directors and to
declare dividends.18 The power of the custodian, however, does not
continue indefinitely but ceases when the court determines that (1)
to restore the management of the corporation to its board of direc-
tors would be in the best interest of its stockholders and the credi-
tors, and (2) in the case where the board of directors were previously
deadlocked in the management of corporate affairs or in its election,
a new board has been duly elected."
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(a)(1)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(b)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (RepI. Vol. 1973).
69. Id. In this regard, see Brennan v. Rollman, 151 Va. 715, 145 S.E. 260 (1928), where the
court held that the chancellor properly refused to dissolve a corporation in a suit brought by
minority stockholders and ordered the corporation turned over to its directors and stockhold-
ers. After appointment of receivers for the otherwise solvent corporation because of gross
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It was established early in the development of corporate law that
courts of equity had the power, upon suit filed by stockholders, to
liquidate a solvent corporation. Contrary to the trend of decisions
in Virginia today, however, the courts in earlier cases exercised their
power with great circumspection which usually resulted in sustain-
ing the corporation's existence from the challenge of minority stock-
holders.'"
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia indicate a
trend away from upholding majority stockholder actions in operat-
ing the corporation to the detriment of minority shareholders. More-
over, recent decisions have gone so far as to state that section 13.1-
94 is remedial in purpose and should be liberally construed.7' In
White and P & W Oil Company v. Perkins," the leading case in this
area, the court ordered the dissolution of a corporation when it
became clear that the owner of fifty-five percent of the outstanding
shares of the corporation was oppressing the minority shareholder,
mismanagement and criminal recklessness of those persons in control, a new board of direc-
tors was elected by an overwhelming majority of stockholders, who were opposed to dissolu-
tion, and the persons who were responsible for the mismanagement and fraud were entirely
eliminated.
70. See, e.g., South Norfolk Land Co. v. Tebault, 124 Va. 667, 98 S.E. 679 (1919); Radford
West End Land Co. v. Cowan, 101 Va. 632, 44 S.E. 753 (1903); and later cases, such as, Louis
Adelman Assoc. v. Goldsten, 209 Va. 731, 167 S.E.2d 104 (1969); Penn v. Pemberton & Penn,
Inc., 189 Va. 649, 53 S.E.2d 823 (1949). But cf, Gudebrod v. Ward's Adm'r, 165 Va. 444, 182
S.E. 118 (1935).
As the Virginia Supreme Court in Brennan v. Rollman, 151 Va. 715, 145 S.E. 260 (1928)
explained:
The power of courts of equity to take possession of, and liquidate a functioning
solvent corporation at the instance of minority stockholders, is recognized in many
jurisdictions, including Virginia. But, while the . . . authorities establish the power
of the courts to dissolve corporations, it is concededly a power that can be easily
abused, and one that should be cautiously exercised. If the purposes for which the
company was formed have become impossible of attainment, and to continue the
business would be manifestly ruinous to its shareholders, equity may interpose but not
otherwise.
Id. at 731, 145 S.E. at 265 (citations omitted).
71. Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., 216 Va. 22, 24, 216 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1975); White and P &
W Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1972). See also Wometco
Enterprises Inc. v. Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 528 F.2d 1128, 1129 (4th Cir.
1976), where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in construing section 13.1-94, held, inter
alia, that the trial court properly applied a test of sharply scrutinizing the dealings between
a corporation and its officers in a stockholders' derivative action alleging mismanagement of
the corporation and seeking the appointment of a court-appointed custodian.
72. 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E. 2d 315 (1972).
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who was owner of the remaining forty-five percent of the outstand-
ing stock within the meaning of section 13.1-94(a)(2).13
However, the court overruled the remedy fashioned by the chan-
cellor which did not order dissolution, but in lieu thereof, and
among other things, disallowed the defendant's claim against the
corporation of over $11,000.00 and ordered that plaintiff be paid
$1,600.00, the equivalent often weeks' salary, as severance pay since
his employment with the company had terminated. In ordering the
outright dissolution of the corporation, the court offered the follow-
ing explanation for its action:
While Code § 13.1-94 is remedial and should be liberally construed,
we believe that the 1968 amendment clearly shows an intent by the
General Assembly that the alternatives provided there are exclusive
rather than inclusive. Having so found, it follows that the trial court
erred in granting the relief which it did.74
From the foregoing it appears that dissolution suits brought by mi-
nority stockholders which fall within and meet any of the four cri-
teria listed in section 13.1-94(a)(1)-(4) will receive liberal, if not
favorable, consideration from the courts in Virginia.
Not only can stockholders file suit to seek a judicial liquidation
of the assets and business of a corporation under section 13.1-94, but
creditors may also file suit under section 13.1-94(b) to liquidate the
assets and business of a corporation when it is established initially
that the corporation is insolvent 5 and that the claim of the creditor
73. The court defined the meaning of the word "oppressive" found in section 13.1-94(a)(2)
as follows:
Oppression as a ground for corporate dissolution would appear to be of fairly recent
origin. The statutory recognition of this ground first occurred in Illinois in 1933.
Central Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 m1. 2d 566, 572, 141 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1957). By 1965 at
least eleven other states, including Virginia, had adopted similar statutes. See 1965
Duke L.J. 128.
The word "oppressive," as used in the statute does not carry an essential inference
of imminent disaster; it can contemplate a continuing course of conduct. The word
does not necessarily savor of fraud, and the absence of "mismanagement, or misappli-
cation of assets," does not prevent a finding that the conduct of the dominant directors
or officers has been oppressive. It is not synonymous with "illegal" and "fraudulent."
213 Va. at 134, 189 S.E.2d at 319.
74. Id. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320 (emphasis added).
75. The word "insolvent" was defined by the Virginia Supreme Court in Martin v. South
Salem Land Co., 94 Va. 28, 26 S.E. 591 (1896) in two contexts:
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has been reduced to judgment and an execution thereon has re-
turned unsatisfied" or the corporation has admitted in writing that
the claim of the creditor is due and owing.77 From the standpoint of
creditors, the overriding consideration is how to obtain dollar-for-
dollar value for the money, goods, or services supplied to the corpo-
ration. In order to aid creditors in their quest to recover the value
of what was lent to the insolvent corporation, the concept of equita-
ble liens, or, as it is more commonly called, the trust fund doctrine,
has evolved. The Supreme Court of Virginia in People's National
Bank v. Morris,7" explained the trust fund doctrine as follows:
The authorities seem to be uniform to the effect that the assets of the
corporation are subject to an equitable lien in favor of the creditors,
and that such creditors may follow such assets or the proceeds
thereof, into whosesoever hands they can trace them and subject
them to such debts, except as against a bona fide purchaser for value.
And where a corporation transfers all its assets to another corporation
with a view of going out of business, and nothing is left with which
to pay its debts, such transferee is charged with notice by the very
circumstance of the transaction, and takes the same cum onere. Such
a case cannot be considered a sale in the due course of business, even
though based on a valuable consideration, as it operates as a fraud
against the creditors.79
The parameters of the trust fund doctrine described above as
applied in Virginia have been stated in the following terms:
[T]he strict view of the "trust fund" doctrine has not been adopted.
In Virginia the trust fund doctrine prevails only to the extent that in
the distribution of the corporate assets a court of equity will satisfy
the claims of the creditors before any distribution can be made among
[Iln its restricted sense, to indicate the inability of an individual to pay his debts as
they become due in the ordinary course of business, or in its general or popular mean-
ing, to denote that the entire assets of a debtor are insufficient to pay his debts.
Id. at 52, 26 S.E. at 598. This concept of insolvency was applied in Gudebrod v. Ward's Adm'r,
185 Va. 444, 182 S.E. 118 (1935) to find a corporation insolvent when it was established in
the lower court that the corporation had accumulated more than $575,000 worth of liabilities
in thirteen years of operation and had total assets estimated between $150,000 to $525,000.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
78. 152 Va. 814, 148 S.E. 828 (1929).
79. Id. at 820, 148 S.E. at 829.
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the stockholders. Within the meaning of this rule, unpaid subscrip-
tions to the corporate stock constitute a part of the corporate assets,
and in this sense of the "trust fund" doctrine constitutes a trust fund
for the payment of creditors."
How much of the creditor's claim can be satisfied from corporate
assets and what liability stockholders incur if capital is distributed
to them before creditor claims have been satisfied was addressed by
the Virginia Supreme Court in Marshall v. Fredericksburg Lumber
Company."'
80. 4B MIcHIE'S JUR. Corporations § 269 (Repl. Vol. 1974). For a discussion of the rights
and priorities of creditors inter se to the assets of an insolvent corporation to liquidate
outstanding debts see 4B MIcHIE'S JuR. Corporations § 270 (Repl. Vol. 1974). It would appear
that in Virginia unpaid stock subscriptions can be used to satisfy creditor claims even if the
initial subscription contract between the corporation and the stockholder was procured
through fraud unless the stockholder makes a sincere attempt to detect the fraud and to
rescind the contract immediately once fraud is discovered. As was noted by the Virginia
Supreme Court in Martin v. South Salem Land Company, 94 Va. 28, 26 S.E. 591 (1896):
The decisions of the courts, we think, sustain the doctrine laid down in the textbooks
that a person who has to all external appearances become a stockholder, cannot, as to
creditors who may have trusted the company upon the faith of his membership, have
his contract of subscription rescinded upon the ground of fraud where he did not
repudiate the contract, and take steps to have it rescinded, before the company
stopped payment and became actually insolvent; certainly not, where it does not
appear that he was diligent in discovering the fraud and prompt in repudiating his
contract after it was discovered.
Id. at 51, 26 S.E. at 598.
81. 162 Va. 136, 173 S.E. 553 (1934).
The court posited its arguments and reasons therefor as follows:
Shares of stock in a corporation, before its dissolution, represent the proportion to
which the shareholder is entitled in the distribution of profits arising from the opera-
tion of the business which may be made from time to time, and in the final distribution
of the estate of the corporation when it ceases to exist and the estate has been fully
administered, including the payment of corporate indebtedness. . . . A stockholder's
rights are deferred to those of a creditor in the distribution of assets. The creditors are
entitled to the full payment of their debts before the stockholder participates therein.
.. . where there are existing creditors of a corporation the stockholders will not be
permitted, as against those creditors, to withdraw the assets of the corporation without
consideration, whether it be done through a purchase of stock by the corporation or
otherwise. We repeat that a stockholder is not entitled to a share of the capital assets
of a corporation until the debts have been paid. If the capital is divided, leaving any
debts unpaid, every stockholder receiving his share, is in equity liable pro rata to
contribute to the discharge of such debts out of the funds so received. Such property
must be devoted, primarily, to the satisfaction of creditors and is subject to their
rights; secondarily, to the stockholders, in proportion to their interests. As to it the
creditors have a prior exclusive equity. In other words stockholders have no right to
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From this case, it would appear that once a creditor or a group of
creditors meet the criteria established in section 13.1-94(b)(1) or
(b) (2) for the liquidation of corporate assets to satisfy their claims,
said claims must be paid in full before the stockholders divide the
remaining assets on a pro rata basis even if it means requiring the
stockholders to pay any outstanding stock subscriptions for the ben-
efit of creditors. If the assets of the insolvent corporation, including
all stock subscriptions, are insufficient to pay the claims of creditors
in full, the creditors will share the existing assets according to their
respective rights and interests. In the situation just described or in
the case where the assets of an insolvent corporation are barely
sufficient to satisfy creditor claims, the stockholders would receive
nothing. In the event, however, that corporate assets sufficiently
liquidate creditor claims and there are remaining assets, Virginia
courts should look to any stock agreements between the sharehold-
ers and should strictly interpret them regardless of any apparent
inequities these agreements may cause. As observed by the Virginia
Supreme Court in Craddock-Terry Company v. Powell:82
"The rights (in a Massachusetts charter) thereby established
with respect to the stockholders as between each other and between
the stockholders and the corporation are contractual. ***
Agreements voluntarily made between such persons are to be held
sacred and enforced by the courts, and are not to be lightly set aside
on the ground of public policy or because as events have turned it
may be unfortunate for one party."
". .. a stipulation plainly made between the stockholders, or
classes of stockholders, as to how the assets of the corporation shall
be distributed among the stockholders in liquidation, after all claims
upon the corporation by creditors and others have been satisfied, is
permissible and valid and is not forbidden by the principles of our
corporation law."83
While the discussion of section 13.1-94 thus far has focused upon
stockholder suits or creditor suits under subsections (a) or (b) re-
spectively, the corporation, the board of directors of the corporation,
anything but the residuum of the capital after the payment of all corporate liabilities.
Id. at 146-47, 173 S.E. at 557 (emphasis added).
82. 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363 (1943).
83. Id. at 447-48, 25 S.E.2d 376 (citations omitted).
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or the Commission may, under certain circumstances described
below, request the court to supervise or to direct the liquidation of
the assets and business of a corporation. Under section 13.1-94(c),
for example, upon the application of a corporation which has filed
a statement of intent to dissolve, the liquidation of the corporation
may be continued under the supervision of the court.84 Moreover,
under section 13.1-94(d) when the board of directors establish that
circumstances make it impossible to obtain a representative vote by
shareholders on the issue of dissolution and that to continue the
business of the corporation would not be in the interest of the share-
holders, the board may request the court to liquidate the assets and
business of the corporation. The situation mentioned above is analo-
gous to a stockholder suit under section 13.1-94(a)(1) and the princi-
ples and current legal trends described with regard to shareholder
suits under section 13.1-94(a) should be applied in similar actions
brought by the board of directors. Finally, pursuant to section 13.1-
94(e), "[w]hen the Commission has instituted a proceeding for the
involuntary dissolution of a corporation and entered an order find-
ing that the corporation should be dissolved but that liquidation of
its business and affairs should precede the entry of an order of
dissolution"8 the liquidation will be conducted under court supervi-
sion. "
In order to effectuate the liquidation of the assets and business
of a corporation under section 13.1-94, the court of equity is vested
with certain powers which are outlined in section 13.1-95 which
provides in relevant part:
[Tihe court shall have power to issue injunctions, to appoint a re-
ceiver or receivers pendente lite, with such powers and duties as the
court, from time to time, may direct, and to take such other proceed-
ings as may be requisite to preserve the corporate assets wherever
situated, and carry on the business of the corporation until a full
hearing can be had.87
84. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-84(c)(Repl. Vol. 1973).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94(e)(Repl. Vol. 1973).
86. It should be noted that in any proceeding brought under section 13.1-94, the statute
further provides: "It shall not be necessary to make directors or stockholders parties to any
such action or proceeding unless relief is sought against them personally." VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-94 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-95 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The powers and duties of the receivers88 cited above are more
clearly defined in the second full paragraph of section 13.1-95. For
instance, a liquidating receiver has the authority "to collect the
assets of the corporation, including all amounts owing to the corpo-
ration by subscribers on account of any unpaid portion of the con-
sideration for the issuance of shares."8 In addition, the receiver, if
authorized by the court, can "sell, convey, and dispose of all or any
part of the assets of the corporation wherever situated, either at
public or private sale.""
Once the affairs of the corporation have been properly taken care
of by the receiver, the Commission, or the directors of the corpora-
tion,9' and the court has issued an appropriate order or the Commis-
sion has issued a certificate of dissolution pursuant to section 13.1-
90, the nonexistence of the corporation does not preclude further
action relating to its prior activities before dissolution or expiration
as stated in the topical heading described below.
IV. SURVIVAL OF REMEDY AFTER DISSOLUTION
Section 13.1-101 permits a corporation, its directors, officers, or
stockholders to sue or be sued after dissolution or expiration of the
corporation and provides in pertinent part: "The dissolution or ex-
piration of a corporation shall not take away or impair any remedy
available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers or
stockholders, for any right or claim existing or any liability incurred,
prior to such dissolution. 92 The instant statute is a complete depar-
ture from the common law rule under which the dissolution of a
corporation meant its existence terminated immediately and
88. The qualifications required to be a receiver are stated in VA CODE ANN. § 13.1-96 (Rep.
Vol. 1973).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-95 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
90. Id.
91. It is of importance to note that section 13.1-98 states in full:
The liquidation of the assets and business of a corporation may be discontinued at
any time during the liquidation proceedings when it is established that cause for
liquidation no longer exists. In such event the court shall dismiss the proceedings and
direct the receiver to redeliver to the corporation all its remaining property and assets.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-98 (Rep]. Vol. 1973).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-101 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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thereby extinguished corporate debts or debts owed to the corpora-
tion; the common law rule for all intents and purposes precluded
suits on behalf of or against a corporation after dissolution. 3 Stat-
93. An early Virginia case, Rider v. Nelson and Albemarle Union Factory, 34 Va. (7 Leigh)
154 (1836), explained the common law rule and lamented legislative inaction to ameliorate
the abuses therefrom, as follows:
It may be proper to add, that it appears to us to be peculiarly desirable, in a country
where numerous companies are annually incorporated for a limited number of years,
that the legislature should provide in detail, what shall be the effect of the expiration
or other determination of their charters, instead of leaving that matter to the embar-
rassment and the obscurity of common law principles. According to them, the debts
of a corporation either to it or from it are extinguished by its dissolution; nor are the
members liable, in their individual characters, for any portion of the debts of the
corporation; 1 Lev. 237. The lands of the corporation revert to the donors; 1 Black.
Comm. 484. The personality, it is supposed, goes to the commonwealth. If these things
be so (and there is no reasonable doubt about it) they are grossly unjust. It cannot be
just, that the members of a joint stock company should forfeit their property to the
commonwealth by the expiration of their charter. It cannot be just, that the land which
they have purchased and paid for, should revert to the grantor who has already re-
ceived value for it. It cannot be just, that those who are indebted to the corporation
(a bank for instance) should be absolved from their engagements; and still less, that
by a forfeiture of its charter, those to whom it is indebted should lose their just
demands.
Id. at 156-57.
The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Miller's Adm'x v. Newburg Orrel Coal Co., 31 W.Va.
836, 8 S.E. 600 (1888), described the General Assembly of Virginia's response to the Rider
decision:
Very soon after Rider v. Factory, supra, was decided, and, according to a suggestion
of the court in that case, the general assembly of Virginia, at its session of 1836-37,
passed an act, which has ever since been in force. This statute, without material
change, was incorporated in our Code of 1868, and has continued to be, and still is, in
force in this State. It provides . . . that . . . 'suits may be brought, continued, or
defended; the property, real or personal, of the corporation be conveyed or transferred,
under the common seal or otherwise; and all lawful acts be done, in the corporate
name, in like manner, and with like effect, as before such dissolution" or expiration;
but so far only as shall be necessary or proper for collecting the debts and claims due
to the corporation, converting its property and assets into money, prosecuting and
protecting its rights, enforcing its liabilities, and paying over and distributing its
property and assets, or the proceeds thereof, to those entitled thereto ... 
Id. at 838-39, 8 S.E. at 601-02.
The court offered this interpretation of the statute:
It provides in general terms, that suits may be brought or defended in the corporate
name with like effect as before the dissolution, so far as shall be necessary for collecting
the debts and enforcing the liabilities of the corporation. This language is certainly
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace any suit, whether in law or in equity, which may
be proper for collecting the debts due to, or enforcing the liabilities against, the corpo-
ration; and this seems also to give effect to the general object and purpose of the
statute.
Id. at 839, 8 S.E. at 602.
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utes enacted to prevent the abuses described in Rider v. The Nelson
and Albemarle Union Factory94 provided for suits to be instituted
against or on behalf of a corporation within three years following
dissolution."5 In 1956, however, the General Assembly made sub-
stantial revisions in the Corporation Code which produced section
13.1-101 in its current form. An excellent analysis comparing the
former code section,96 which permitted sujts to be instituted by or
against a corporation within a three-year period, with section 13.1-
101 is found in United States v. Village Corporation.9" The court
explained:
Under old Title 13, corporate existence was continued after dissolu-
tion, for the purposes of liquidation, for a period of three years, and
during that period actions could be instituted by or against it in its
corporate name. Dissolution did not abate pending actions. The
directors, as trustees, were required to proceed with the liquidation
of the corporation. Upon application of a creditor or stockholder, an
appropriate court of Virginia was authorized to continue the author-
ity of the directors as trustees or to appoint a receiver, the trustees
or the receiver being authorized, in the name of the corporation, to
defend the suit brought by the applying creditor or stockholder.
For this somewhat cumbersome procedure, new Title 13.1 substi-
tuted a simplified remedy. It authorized actions by or against the
corporation, and in its corporate name, after dissolution without a
limitation of time. Under the new statute, passage of time after the
date of dissolution is without significance. A court order continuing
the authority of directors or appointing a receiver is no longer a prere-
quisite to the institution of an action against a corporation in dissolu-
tion at any time.
It should be observed that in a footnote immediately following the
statement quoted above, that "passage of time after the date of
dissolution is without significance," the court qualified its pro-
nouncement by cautioning: "Of course, general statutes of limita-
94. 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 154 (1836). See note 93 supra.
95. See former § 3810 of the Code of Virginia as discussed in Shepherd v. F.J. Kress Box
Co., 154 Va. 421, 426, 153 S.E. 649, 650 (1930).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-70 repealed 1956 VA. ACTS ch. 428.
97. 298 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962).
98. Id. at 817-18.
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tion referable to the accrual of the cuase of action remain appli-
cable.""9 Moreover, "[s]tatutes of this type are remedial and
should be broadly and liberally construed. Obviously it would be
intolerable and contrary to public policy to permit a corporation to
evade civil liability or to escape criminal penalties by voluntarily
terminating its existence."''
An issue which could arise under section 13.1-101, which, to date,
has not developed, is what is the liability of a corporation which
succeeds to the assets of another for the debts of the selling corpora-
tion. This problem would ordinarily manifest itself in the context
of a merger and was addressed by the Virginia Supreme Court in
Pepper v. Dixie Splint Coal Co., 101 which posited four criteria, any
one of which would be sufficient to render the purchasing company
liable for the debts of the selling corporation when it appears:
(a) there [is] an agreement to assume such debt; (b) the circumstan-
ces surrounding the transaction must warrant a finding that there
was a consolidation of the two corporations; or (c) that the purchasing
corporation was a mere continuation of the selling corporation; or (d)
that the transaction was fraudulent in fact. 0 2
In applying the above-mentioned criteria the court should carefully
scrutunize the activities of the two corporations and should construe
section 13.1-101 broadly, especially where the rights of creditors are
jeopardized.
V. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A thorough review of Article 7 of the Corporation Code indicates
that particular provisions should be combined, amended, or deleted
entirely to provide a more equitable and understandable code for
the dissolution of corporations. At this point certain suggestions are
offered which the General Assembly will hopefully consider, or, at
the very least, will prompt interested legislators to review Article 7
with a view toward enacting amendments or repealing obsolete and
99. Id. at 818 n. 10. See generally, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-228 to -256 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
100. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers, 145 F. Supp. 374,375 (D. Md. 1956)
which found a corporate defendant in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
101. 165 Va. 179, 181 S.E. 406 (1935).
102. Id. at 191, 181 S.E. at 410 (citations omitted).
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redundant sections to aid the corporation, its officers, directors,
shareholders, and the general public.
One necessary change should be the total elimination of section
13.1-80 (the voluntary dissolution of a corporation provision by the
written consent of all stockholders). ' It is submitted that in the
overwhelming number of situations this provision will never be
used; large corporations have too many stockholders to obtain the
required unanimity and small or closely-held corporations are too
often divided among various factions (especially in closed corpora-
tions where family disputes concerning the proper operation of the
business frequently develop) with irreconcilable differences which
makes total agreement on anything impossible to achieve. More-
over, requiring the unanimous vote of all stockholders to secure a
voluntary dissolution appears at odds with section 13.1-81 which
requires in comparison an affirmative vote of more than two-thirds
of the shares entitled to vote or upon the resolution affirmatively
adopted by the holders of more than two-thirds of the shares of any
class of stock entitled to vote on the question of dissolution. If two-
thirds of the holders of any class of stock entitled to vote on the
question of dissolution is enough to subject a corporation to volun-
tary dissolution proceedings, why is it necessary to mandate under
section 13.1-80 the unanimous vote of stockholders on the same
issue? In reality section 13.1-80 is at best repetitious and at worst
confusing when compared with section 13.1-81. Accordingly, when-
ever more than two-thirds of the stockholders or more than two-
thirds of the shares of stock entitled to vote do, in fact, vote for
voluntary dissolution, their preference should be honored by the
Commission if the formal requirements for dissolution are subse-
quently met. ' "'
103. Total elimination of this provision would also require the complete repeal of section
13.1-85 which provides for the revocation of voluntary dissolution proceedings by consent of
all stockholders. Clearly, if section 13.1-80 is eliminated, the need for section 13.1-85 likewise
ceases to exist.
104. By way of further suggestion, section 13.1-81 (a) should be amended to include, in
addition to a resolution adopted by the board of directors, an alternative section calling for a
resolution adopted by a significant number of shares entitled to vote on the issue of dissolu-
tion, such as 20%, 25%, or 33%, to force a meeting to decide the question of whether the
corporation should voluntarily dissolve. A provision of this sort might be necessary since an
indifferent or insensitive board of directors may never adopt a resolution seeking voluntary




The second and last full paragraph of section 13.1-82, in response
to Jeffries v. Commonwealth,105 requires the Commission to care-
fully review a statement of intent to dissolve filed by a public service
corporation before said statement is approved to determine whether
the corporation is actually performing any public service, whether
the corporation should be required to continue to perform any pub-
lic service, or whether the public convenience and necessity man-
date the continuation of the public service performed by the corpo-
ration. Beyond the criteria stated above, there is no mention in the
statute of how or in what manner the Commission should make its
determination.
Public service corporations, which provide such vital services as
gas, electricity, water, and transportation should be given the op-
portunity to state their case for dissolution and should not be con-
fined to a cursory statement of intent to dissolve which is all they
are obliged to file under section 13.1-80 or section 13.1-81. In addi-
tion, affected customers, consumer groups, and the like should also
have a forum to present their views on the voluntary dissolution of
the corporation. Given these considerations and the trend in many
jurisdictions to permit the public to participate in legislative or
quasi-legislative proceedings under so-called "sunshine laws", pro-
vision should be made within section 13.1-82 for the holding of pub-
lic hearings in the locality where the service would be curtailed or
eliminated via dissolution to permit, first of all, interested parties
to present their opinions, but more importantly, to insure that the
Commission has sufficient information to make an informed and
intelligent decision concerning matters of great private and public
interest. Only in this way can all parties be assured that they had a
fair opportunity to present their case and that the decision of the
Commission was made with full knowledge of all relevant factors.
Section 13.1-83 provides, inter alia, that once a corporation files
a statement of intent to dissolve, it "shall cease to carry on its
business, except insofar as may be necessary for the winding up
thereof."'' 6 Section 13.1-84(b) describes a laundry-list of duties a
corporation must perform after its statment of intent to dissolve is
105. 121 Va. 425, 93 S.E. 701 (1917). See note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-83 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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filed. Although the items outlined in section 13.1-84(b) appear to be
in the nature of winding up the affairs of a corporation, nothing is
stated in either of the two statutes under discussion which
specifically indicates what constitutes winding up the business and
affairs of a corporation; accordingly, either section 13.1-83 or section
13.1-84 should state without equivocation what constitutes winding
up within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, and of critical
importance, section 13.1-83 or section 13.1-84 should be amended to
provide for criminal sanctions'"7 in the event the corporation or its
trustees continue to operate the business as a going concern contrary
to its statement of intent to dissolve. Criminal sanctions should
deter corporate officials from going beyond the scope of winding up
the affairs of a corporation and thereby prevent conduct which
would be detrimental to third parties (creditors and employees
alike).
The suggestion described above should also be incorporated into
the automatic and involuntary dissolution provisions of the Code
which likewise provide for the winding up of the affairs of a corpora-
tion by the directors, who, by operation of law, become trustees of
the corporation. Although such criminal sanctions may appear
harsh even if made a misdemeanor with a minor monetary penalty
and/or imprisonment, it must be borne in mind that the ability of
individuals to avail themselves of the corporate form and thereby
limit their personal liability is a right created by the state and
should not be abused by persons who would hold themselves out to
the world as representing a non-existent principal, i.e., the corpora-
tion, when in fact they are a sole proprietorship or a partnership.
Such actions are generally a willful and conscious concealment of a
material fact and tantamount to fraud upon the "corporation's"
customers, creditors, and employees, and serves to undermine the
free enterprise system; in short, continuing the business of a corpo-
ration instead of winding it up pursuant to definite statutory guide-
107. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.530 (Vernon 1966), which states in its entirety:
Any person, or persons, who shall exercise, or attempt to exercise, any of the powers,
privileges, or franchises of any corporation after the certificate of incorporation or of
the authority of the same has been forfeited and canceled as in this chapter provided




lines works to everyone's detriment and should not go unpunished
by the state.
Finally, section 13.1-91, which provides for automatic dissolution
of a corporation if it fails to file on two successive annual dates its
annual report or to pay its annual registration fee or franchise tax
as required by law, should be combined with section 13.1-93 to form
one automatic or involuntary dissolution statute. It is difficult to
find any substantive or quantitative harm to the state in a corpora-
tion's failure to perform the obligations described above as com-
pared with a finding by the Commission that the corporation has
continued to exceed or abuse the" authority conferred upon it by law,
has failed to maintain a registered office or a registered agent within
the state, or has failed to comply with any act required by the
Commission pursuant to section 13.1-93.18 All of the requirements
mentioned above, while serving the public interest, nevertheless are
essentially clerical in nature (with the possible exception of exceed-
ing or abusing the authority to conduct a business as specified in a
corporation's charter), and the right to official notice of impending
dissolution and the opportunity to be heard on the issue, as provided
in section 13.1-93, should be provided for all corporate failures to
meet the clerical obligations in question. In this way the corporation
can explain its actions or inactions and fulfill any derelict responsi-
bilities before its charter is automatically or involuntarily forfeited
by the state. This procedure, although on its face an apparent drain
on the resources of the Commission, might prevent prospective fail-
ures to perform the administrative duties under discussion and, if
the corporation agrees to live up to its responsibilities, the need of
the corporation to proceed with any reinstatement procedures would
also be eliminated thereby saving the Commission work in the long
run. With regard to reinstatement, since section 13.1-93 has its own
reinstatement provision which is identical with the separate rein-
statement provision found in section 13.1-92, which applies exclu-
sively to automatic dissolution, combining sections 13.1-91 and
13.1-93 into one statute would eliminate the need to have a separate
reinstatment provision and would require the repeal of section 13.1-
92.
108. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-93 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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In conclusion, it is the author's desire that the explanation of the
mechanics of Article 7, the analysis of the current status and trends
in Virginia case law involving the major issues discussed herein, and
the suggested improvements for Article 7 through legislative reform,
have provided the Virginia legal community, and the various inter-
ests represented by that community, with a better understanding of
their rights, obligations, and limitations so that ultimately any ine-
quities inherent in dissolving a corporation which seriously affects
any interest, will be resolved, either legislatively, administratively,
or judicially, for the betterment of all parties concerned.
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